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Abstract 
In the modern economy, cities are assumed to be in fierce competition over attracting foreign 
investments in leading sectors of the world economy. Despite the rich theoretical discourse on 
these ‘wars’, it remains unclear which territories are competing with each other over which 
types of investments Combining insights from international economics, international 
business, and urban systems literature, we develop an indicator to measure revealed 
competition between territories for investments based on the overlap of investment portfolios 
of regions. Taking competition for greenfield investments between European regions as a test 
subject, we identify competitive market segments, derive the competitive threat a region faces 
from other regions, the competitive threat regions pose to other regions, and the most 
important market segments in which regions compete. We show that European regions with 
similar locational endowments pose a fiercer competitive threat to one another. In addition, 
regions that are sufficiently large and distinctive, face the smallest average competitive threat 
from all other regions. 
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1. Introduction 
In a globalising world in which the mobility of capital steadily increases, cities and regions 
increasingly compete over drawing multinational corporations (MNCs) to their territory. 
These ‘place wars’ can take place at local, regional, national, continental, or even global 
spatial scales (Gordon, 1999). To boost their economies and increase their standards of living, 
cities and regions have to work on their ability to successfully compete with other territories 
(i.e., competitive advantage) over attracting foreign investments in leading sectors of the 
world economy (Storper, 1997; Kitson et al., 2004).1 Today, local and regional governments 
not only use incentive-based policies (e.g., subsidies, taxes) but also capacity-building 
policies such as government spending on amenities, education, physical infrastructure, and 
public transportation networks to foster the attractiveness of their territory (Begg, 1999). At 
the same time, taking advantage of a territory’s sources of competitive advantage has moved 
to the central stage in local and regional development policy: the marketing and branding of 
cities and regions has become a ‘booming business’ (Paddison, 1993; Van der Berg and 
Braun, 1999), while budgets for place promotion are ever increasing (LeRoy, 2005; Markusen 
and Nesse, 2007).  
The increasing interest in urban and regional competitive advantage has resulted in a 
substantial number of ranking lists, in which cities and regions are compared on the basis of 
their internal characteristics, such as their economic performance (Kresl and Singh, 1999), 
global connectivity (Taylor, 2004), creativity and innovativeness (Florida, 2005), and quality 
of life (Rogerson, 1999). This benchmarking of cities and regions is not only found in 
academia and commercial research but is also strongly embedded in public policy and popular 
culture. Today, local authorities increasingly publicise their relative competitive stance with 
that of other areas (Malecki, 2002; Kitson et al., 2004), while many magazines (e.g., Fortune 
Magazine, Forbes, Money) seem to be obsessed with rankings how cities and regions 
compare to each other (McCann, 2004). In this light, several studies and policy reports have 
also addressed the competitive advantage of territories in attracting foreign investments (e.g., 
UNCTAD, 2001).  
Nevertheless, in the discussion on urban and regional competition, it remains unclear 
which territories are competing with each other over which types of investments. In other 
words, most studies that present performance rankings of cities and regions implicitly assume 
that all cities and regions compete to the same extent with each other and little attention is 
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paid to identifying the scope and intensity of territorial competition. This assumption is not 
surprising, as competition is often conceptualised as a characteristic of a market in economics, 
and therefore, all local and regional governments would compete over foreign investments. 
Still, the ‘market for investments’ is highly segmented or, at best, not a level playing field 
(Phelps and Wu, 2009). Despite the increasing mobility of capital, only a limited number of 
locations can satisfy the criteria of an MNC that would like to invest in a particular project 
abroad (Lall and Pietrobelli, 2002; Dunning and Narula, 2004; Narula and Bellak, 2009). This 
fact is reflected in the location choice process of MNCs, in which the majority of all potential 
locations in the world are not even considered by company site selectors (Aharoni, 1966; 
Buckley et al., 2007; Mataloni Jr., 2010).2  
The need to focus on capitalising particular potentials that a city or region has is 
increasingly recognised and anticipated by local and regional development agencies that try to 
attract specific foreign investments to their territory and to articulate distinctive assets of their 
region in promotional marketing (Young et al., 1994; Raines, 2004). In this respect, cities and 
regions have also become aware that foreign investments are not a sine qua non for economic 
growth (Mencinger, 2003; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004) and that it is best to attract 
investments that complement their economic structure to profit most from spillovers 
(Dunning and Narula, 2004; Narula and Bellak, 2009). Inter-territorial relationships, then, are 
not necessarily competitive in nature but can also be cooperative in how firms use places in 
different ways (Taylor, 2010; Van Oort et al., 2010). Cities and regions can be 
complementary to the extent that they exploit different sources of competitive advantage and, 
hence, fulfil different economic roles within the urban system (Gordon, 1999; Taylor, 2010).3  
Exploring the intensity of competition between regions over foreign investments fills an 
urgent need in the academic literature and in policy discourse. First, shifting the focus from 
measuring competitive advantage to measuring competition can contribute to the literature on 
territorial competition by providing a method to estimate the degree to which cities and 
regions are in competition, to identify clusters of competitive cities and regions, and to 
analyse the sources of territorial competition. Second, identifying the most important 
competitors of cities and regions provides a much better foundation for benchmarking 
(Bristow, 2005; Luque-Martínez and Muñoz-Leiva, 2005) as well as valuable input for local 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 At the same time, attracting many (high-level) investments can be a source of competitive advantage in that it generates a demonstration 
effect (Budd, 1998) as well as agglomeration externalities. 
2 This is also reflected in the very uneven distribution of foreign investments across the world (see e.g., Wall et al., 2011). 
3 This is also reflected in the work of Hewings, Sonis and associates (e.g., Hewings et al., 1996; Sonis and Hewings, 2000; Márquez and 
Hewings, 2003), who have shown that economic growth in one place does not necessarily obstruct but can also stimulate growth in other 
places. 
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and regional policymakers. For example, having identified the most important competitors of 
a particular city or region, it becomes easier for government officials to recognise which 
aspects of territorial competitive advantage should be improved to increase the likelihood of 
attracting foreign investments. Hence, a good understanding of the competition and 
complementarities in urban systems clears the path to more goal-directed and effective 
strategic planning and policy-making with regard to territorial competitive advantage and 
long-term economic development strategies (Porter, 2000; Malecki, 2004).  
Combining insights from international economics, international business, and urban 
systems literature, we develop an indicator to measure revealed competition between 
territories for investments. Focusing on the overlap of investment portfolios, it is argued that 
regions are in competition to the extent that they receive investments for the same functions, 
for the same sectors, and from similar parts of the world. In particular, we focus on the 
measurement of competition for greenfield investments (new investments as well as 
expansions) between NUTS-2 regions in the European Economic Area (EEA)4 and in 
Switzerland. European integration, which has facilitated the free movement of capital, goods, 
and workers and has gradually removed economic, social, and cultural differences between 
countries, has blurred national boundaries, resulting in the growth of territorial competition 
(e.g., Cheshire and Gordon, 1995; 1998; Gordon, 1999; Budd, 1998; Begg, 1999; Cheshire, 
1999; Lever, 1999; Markusen and Nesse, 2007; Chien and Gordon, 2008). Today, MNCs 
increasingly perceive Europe as a relatively integrated territory rather than a collection of 
independent countries. Hence, European regions with similar characteristics situated in 
different countries are often perceived as closer substitutes than dissimilar regions in the same 
country (Basile et al., 2009). As location decisions involved in greenfield investments are not 
influenced by past capital instalments of the investee (unlike the acquisition of existing 
companies), these types of investments are useful for examining regional competition.5 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we focus on the 
conceptualisation of territorial competition for foreign investments within the context of 
MNC behaviour and the European enlargement. Section 3 introduces our measure of revealed 
competition between regions. Section 4 introduces our data. Section 5 provides an empirical 
analysis of competition between European regions, and section 6 contains the discussion and 
conclusion. 
                                                 
4 Here, we define the EEA as the EU-25, Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein. 
5 Cross-border greenfield investments constitute about 22% of all FDI in the world. The bulk of FDI takes the form of cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions (Brakman et al., 2006). 
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2. Competition for Greenfield Investments 
2.1. Multinationals and Location Choice 
Foreign investments are long-range investments made by an MNC in a country other than the 
country in which the MNC has its home base. Based on Dunning’s OLI paradigm (1993), 
firms decide to invest abroad when they have market power given by the ownership (O) of 
products or production processes, a location advantage (L) in locating their plant in a foreign 
country rather than in their home country, and an advantage gained from internationalising (I) 
their foreign activities in fully owned subsidiaries rather than carrying them out through 
market transactions (trade) or networked relationships with other firms (licensing and 
franchising).  
From the perspective of the internal organisation of the MNC, it is possible to distinguish 
between horizontal and vertical foreign investments (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). 
Horizontal foreign investments involve investments in which a firm ‘duplicates’ abroad a 
number of its activities conducted in the home country. The main trade-off faced by firms 
engaging in this type of investment is between the increased sales, strategic advantage, and 
lower transport costs to be gained from operating abroad versus the forgone economies of 
scale at the plant level. Vertical foreign investments are investments in which a firm decides 
to geographically disperse its activities by function, whereby some of these functions are 
performed abroad. Here, the main trade-off is between the lower factor costs associated with 
investing abroad versus the increased trade costs and foregone economies of scale at the firm 
level. 
Related to the OLI paradigm and the distinction between horizontal and vertical foreign 
investments, Dunning (1993; 1998) mentions four main motivations for firms to 
internationalise the production process and stress the location advantage: (1) access to natural 
resources (i.e., the natural resource-seeking motive); (2) access to new markets (i.e., the 
market-seeking motive); (3) the restructuring of production to reduce the costs of production 
related to labour, machinery and materials and increase efficiency (i.e., the efficiency-seeking 
motive); and (4) access to strategically related created assets (i.e., the strategic-asset-seeking 
motive).  
The success of a region in attracting foreign investments largely depends on its relative 
attractiveness vis-à-vis other regions in terms of local resource availability. One can think 
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here of an abundance of natural resources, large domestic markets, special tax breaks for 
MNCs, or a large pool of skilled workers. However, the relative importance of the different 
sources of competitive advantage varies across the motives of MNCs to invest abroad. A 
manufacturing plant predominantly needs low-wage modestly skilled labour and cheap land; 
sales and marketing offices call for a large domestic market in order to prosper; and high 
competence investments, such as R&D and headquarters functions, require high-level local 
resources that are often associated with agglomeration economies, clusters of related 
activities, and specialised skills (Narula and Bellak, 2009). Hence, MNCs with different 
motives to invest abroad will tend to focus on different location characteristics.  
Along these lines, it can be argued that MNCs are constrained in their location choice by 
local resource availability, and not all regions are suitable for all types of investments because 
they lack the appropriate specialised location advantages. (Raines, 2003; Mataloni Jr., 2010). 
Especially for investments in knowledge-intensive sectors and R&D and headquarters 
functions, the number of potential locations is limited given the very specific location 
requirements with respect to human capital. As indicated by Phelps et al. (1998), Gordon 
(1999) and Raines (2004), territorial competition would then also be most prevalent for the 
more standardized investments such as production plants. 
 In this light, Narula and Bellak (2009) and McCann (2011) have indicated that there 
exists a clear hierarchy of foreign activities in Europe, with the most advanced economies 
hosting the highest value-added activities, such as headquarters and R&D functions.6 In 
contrast, foreign investments in Central and Eastern Europe are generally confined to lower 
value-added activities such as manufacturing plants and sales and marketing offices. 
Empirical support for this hierarchy is provided by Defever (2005) and Castellani and Pieri 
(2010), who show a concentration of foreign investments in R&D and headquarter functions 
in the core regions of Western Europe, while logistics, production, sales and marketing units 
are more evenly spread across the continent. Similar differences can be observed when 
examining economic sectors instead of activities: foreign investments in knowledge-intensive 
manufacturing and services are more spatially concentrated than their less knowledge-
intensive counterparts (Castellani and Pieri, 2010). The wider distribution of the less 
knowledge-intensive investments suggests a higher degree of territorial competition for these 
types of investment projects (Raines, 2003).  
 
2.2 Territorial Competition for Foreign Investments 
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The majority of all potential locations in the world are not even considered by MNCs that aim 
to set up a subsidiary. This selectiveness of MNCs has important implications for territorial 
competition. Within the economic geography and regional science literature, territorial 
competition refers to “the actions of economics agents that are taken to enhance the standard 
of living in their own territories, such as regions, cities, or countries” (Poot, 2000, p. 205). 
Accordingly, it is not the regions that are in competition, but groups representing territorially 
based economic interests (Gordon and Cheshire, 1998). In particular, local and regional 
government officials engage in competitive activity because of electoral pressures to create 
jobs and safeguard business interests. In addition, officials often wish to be perceived as 
proactive in stimulating local and regional economic development (Turok, 2004; Markusen 
and Nesse, 2007). In recent years, the focus on territorial competition has grown along with 
an emphasis on attracting foreign investments (Lovering, 2003), where foreign investments 
are seen as both an instrument and an indication of territorial competitiveness. ‘Competitive’ 
territories attract more foreign investments, while foreign investments are thought to increase 
the competitive advantage of territories by creating new employment and bringing new 
knowledge and technologies to a region.7  
In principle, regions compete to have the best locational endowments (Budd, 1998). 
However, there are many different policies to increase territorial competitiveness, ranging 
from incentive-based (tax benefits and subsidies) and rules-based (regulation) to capacity 
building policies related to improving the quality of place (Tewdwr-Jones and Phelps, 2000; 
Globerman and Chen, 2010). As indicated by Raines (2003) and Turok (2004), the most 
recent initiatives of authorities to attract foreign investments involve the augmentation and 
exploitation of regional assets related to specialised labour pools, university research, and 
even lifestyle and culture (Turok, 2004). These initiatives not only include capacity-building 
policies aimed at boosting long-run productivity, but also the selective attraction of inward 
investments using incentives and a marketing focus that emphasise and reinforce the 
distinctive strengths of a territory (Raines, 2003). In other words, local and regional policies 
tend to focus on enhancing the ‘stickiness’ of places (cf. Markusen, 1996). With respect to 
foreign investments, the aim is not only to attract high value-added investments, but also to 
avoid the relocation of firms and attract re-investments by MNCs already present in the 
region.  
                                                                                                                                                        
6 The development of such pattern was already predicted by Hymer (1970) 
7 Nevertheless, most local and regional development policies are not specifically targeted at attracting foreign investments and maintaining 
MNC establishments, but at stimulating the business climate in general (Budd, 1998; Malecki, 2004; Turok, 2004).  
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By developing a distinctive competitive advantage and targeting specific investments, 
authorities also try to avoid vulnerability and intensive territorial competition by creating a 
‘market niche’. Investments requiring high asset specificity especially are closely linked to 
particular locations (Phelps and Raines, 2003). This focus on the distinctiveness of regions 
echoes a sector- and function-based response to territorial competition (Raines, 2003), in 
which regions improve and exploit the characteristics that distinguish them from other regions 
(Begg, 1999). Such acquisition strategy for inward investments linked to a functional and 
sectoral focus for aspects of regional development also has clear attractiveness for the 
organisation of marketing around coherent descriptions of a region’s competitive advantage 
(Raines, 2003). Thus, officials also increasingly realise that the nature of a particular 
investment limits the number of locations that can satisfy its criteria, and a region can best 
attract investments that complement their economic structure.  First, it will require less effort 
from regions to attract these kinds of investments. Given that MNCs match corporate assets 
and locational requirements, it is important to target those investments for which the region is 
part of the consideration set of MNCs. Second, it can be expected that MNC establishments 
that are better embedded in the regional economic structure are less likely to relocate and 
more likely to receive reinvestments at a later stage.  
These factors do not mean that all differentiation and discrimination policies are equally 
well founded, as some sectors and functions are clearly preferred over others by authorities. 
Today, biotechnology, software, and financial and business services are popular targets, while 
labour-intensive and less knowledge-intensive services tend to be neglected. Acquisition 
strategies based on groundless mimicry of successful regions, such as Silicon Valley and 
Cambridge, are also still commonly practiced in local and regional development policies and 
place marketing (Malecki, 2004; Turok 2004; 2009). Turok (2009) rightfully questions the 
use of such wasteful policies by less well-endowed regions. In fact, it is unrealistic to expect 
that every territory can become a financial centre or a leading knowledge-driven economy. 
Also, given the specific location requirements of an MNC, the opportunities for attracting 
high-quality investments are extremely limited for those regions. Not only is such strategy a 
waste of time and money, but it also under-utilises the assets present in a region. 
Along these lines, competition based on low taxes and low-wage labour has not 
disappeared. Regions that lack high-skilled labour and a sophisticated economic base are 
often desperate to attract low value-added foreign investments, such as sales and marketing 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9 
 
offices and production-based units (Malecki, 2004). As these relatively standardised 
investments do not require specific location factors and because MNCs can play off 
governments against each other, incentive-based competition is expected be fiercest for these 
types of investment (Raines, 2003).  
However, the European Union has always tried to avoid such a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ by 
banning most subsidies to business for plant locations (Cheshire and Gordon, 1998; Markusen 
and Nesse, 2007), where only some underdeveloped countries are allowed to attract foreign 
investments using incentive-based policies. However, as indicated by Markusen and Nesse 
(2007), this regulatory scheme of the European Union does not extend to local and regional 
governments’ use of their own resources or taxing policies to attract MNCs, except when 
national authorities compensate them for such inducements. Although such local and regional 
discretionary powers are at present relatively limited, it can be expected that they will increase 
in the future when European countries transfer economic development policies to sub-national 
levels of government.  
 
 
 
2.3 MNCs, Territorial Competition and Territorial Complementarities 
However, there can also be competitive tensions between subsidiaries of the same MNC 
(Phelps and Fuller, 2000; Phelps and Raines, 2003). As indicated by Phelps and Fuller (2000), 
subsidiaries can have autonomous corporate agendas and, hence, within the same MNC 
subsidiaries compete for repeat investments. Phelps and Fuller (2000) address intra-MNC 
competitive processes that are initiated by changing divisions of labour within the MNC in 
which subsidiaries can win or lose responsibilities. Indeed, such competition can be fierce in 
light of corporate restructuring, in which some subsidiaries must be discontinued, whereas 
other subsidiaries receive reinvestments and can expand. Therefore, territorial competition 
can be perceived as an unintended consequence of the goal-directed behaviour of firm 
establishments, in which governments become involved because foreign activity is important 
for territorial competitive advantage (Raines, 2003). Hence, territories compete because 
subsidiaries of the same MNC compete.  
Nevertheless, this dynamic provides an incomplete description of the relationships 
between territories. Relationships between MNC subsidiaries can be complementary in that 
they fulfil different functions within the organisation. In this respect, Beaverstock (2001) and 
Taylor (2010) highlight an example of financial and other services providers in Frankfurt and 
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London. By means of interviews with practitioners in firms that had offices in both cities, it 
became clear that the relationship between Frankfurt and London was mainly complementary: 
London served as a strategic centre for global business, while the Frankfurt office was mainly 
serving the European market. Thus, both cities are used by the same MNC, but in different 
ways. Hence, territories are not necessarily in competition, as they can have distinct 
competitive advantages used by firms for different reasons and, hence, can cooperate on the 
basis of mutuality (Gordon, 1999; Taylor, 2010; Van Oort et al., 2010). In this respect, 
complementarities are present between differently specialised regions that are linked through 
input-output relations (Scott and Storper, 2007).8  
 
2.4 MNCs, European Integration and Territorial Competition 
The viewpoint of the existence of investments between similar subsidiaries/regions is more 
prevalent within an integrated market. In international economics, attention has been paid to 
horizontal foreign investments, in which MNCs build to overcome high trade costs. In this 
situation, there is a complementary relationship between similar subsidiaries within the same 
MNC. Although these subsidiaries conduct the same economic activities, they serve different 
markets. Thus, territorial competition between regions with similar locational endowments is 
also more opaque. 
However, within the light of globalisation and European integration, vertical investments 
gain significance due to a reduction of trade costs at the expense of horizontal investments. 
The removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and the free movement of capital and 
labour in the European Union in combination with decreasing transportation costs and 
improved information and communication technologies is generating a European economy in 
which MNCs can concentrate particular activities of their value chain in one single location. 
According to Cheshire and Gordon (1995, p. 111), “companies are increasingly restructuring 
themselves to serve the European market as a whole rather than a set of national markets. 
They eliminate national headquarters and have just a European headquarters; they have 
European-wide marketing strategies; they streamline their production range and concentrate 
their production”. 
Horizontal foreign investments can be considered a substitute for trade (Barba Navaretti 
and Venables, 2004), where MNCs can overcome trade barriers by setting up foreign 
subsidiaries to serve foreign markets. By the creation of the Single Market, such trade barriers 
                                                 
8 For example, a region specialized in financial services, can provide these services to a territory specialized in manufacturing, and vice 
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have been diminished within the Europe, thus discouraging horizontal foreign investments 
between countries within the European Union. Due to market enlargement, foreign 
investments from outside the European Union have increased, but this often takes the form of 
export-platform foreign investments in which the whole of the European Union is served by a 
non-European MNC from one single location (Neary, 2002).  At the same time, the decrease 
of barriers to trade has stimulated investments of the vertical variety, which is complementary 
to trade. Due to decreased investment and trade costs, MNCs could no longer easily take 
advantage of differences in factor prices between regions, resulting in a slicing up of the value 
chain.  
These developments not only occur in manufacturing industries but increasingly so in 
services, where trade costs have traditionally been higher due to intensive face-to-face 
interaction (Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2004; McCann, 2008). However, due to technical 
advancements, such as the acceptance of English as the lingua franca and the liberalisation of 
trade in services, the fragmentation of the commodity chain is also becoming a more common 
practice in services (Deardoff, 2001; Head et al., 2009). Hence, it is expected that territorial 
competition for services functions will further increase in the near future. 
2.5. Towards Measurement of Competition for Greenfield Investments 
From the above review, it has become clear that the relationship between regions is both of 
competitive and cooperative nature. Regions that have different specializations and 
orientations are likely to be active in different segments in the market for investments. Based 
on the tension between competition and complementary relations between territories, three 
conditions for the existence of territorial competition can be identified: (1) sectoral market 
overlap, (2) functional market overlap, and (3) geographical market overlap. Accordingly, 
competition for investments is conceptualised as the lack of inter-regional differentiation, in 
which regions have overlapping segments. In the ‘market for investments’, in which 
territories supply and MNCs demand locations, territorial competition would be high when 
territories receive investments for the same functions and sectors from similar parts of the 
world. Likewise, regions would be complementary when territories receive investments for 
different functions and sectors from different parts of the world. In the next section, we will 
introduce a measure to quantify the degree of competition for investments between regions 
that takes in these three conditions.  
                                                                                                                                                        
versa. 
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3. Quantifying Territorial Competition for Investments 
The degree of territorial competition (and complementarities) over attracting foreign 
investments can be assessed by examining the overlap in investment portfolios. The 
investment portfolio of a territory reveals the competitive advantage for foreign investments 
in that territory (UNCTAD, 2001). Hence, the investment portfolio of a territory displays 
information about the attractiveness of territories for particular foreign investments. In this 
manner, it is acknowledged that MNCs can use territories in different ways, and territories 
that have similar locational assets function as substitutes. Accordingly, relations between 
territories with similar investment portfolios are competitive, while relations between 
territories that have different investment portfolios are cooperative. Based on our theoretical 
framework, three conditions for the existence of competition between regions for investments 
have been identified: (1) sectoral similarity in investments, (2) functional similarity, and (3) 
geographical similarity. Accordingly, the revealed competition between territories is high 
when they receive investments for the same sectors and functions from similar parts of the 
world.  
Although relatively absent in the study of foreign investments, similarity indices have 
been extensively used in the social sciences to assess revealed competition between members 
of a given population based on niche overlap.  In its original connotation, a niche of species is 
defined as the set of environmental states in which a species thrives, and it typically consists 
of the resources on which a species depends for its survival, such as its natural habitat from 
which it collects food. From the 1970s onwards, the concept of niche has been introduced in 
the social sciences, most notably in organisation studies (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 
Podolny et al., 1996) and social network analysis (McPherson, 1983; Burt and Talmud, 1993).  
Likewise, in international economics, the Finger-Kreinin index (Finger and Kreinin, 1979) 
has been used to assess the competitive threat one country poses the other (see e.g., Jenkins, 
2008; Duboz and Le Gallo, 2011). This measure uses a relative Manhattan index-based 
indicator to measure the similarity in export structure between two countries. Applied to the 
context of foreign investments, the degree of similarity in the investment portfolio structure of 
regions i and j can be expressed as the overlapping of market segments h between i and j.  A 
market segment is here defined as a group of investments that share the same (1) sector, (2) 
function, and (3) world region of origin. Hence, foreign investments in low-tech 
manufacturing production plants originating from Asia are treated as a different segment from 
that consisting of investments in financial services headquarters originating from North 
13 
 
America.  More formally, the similarity S between the investment portfolios of regions i and j 
can be expressed as follows: 
 
,                                                                                                  (1) 
in which  is the share of the market segment h in region i’s portfolio of investments, and 
 is the share of the market segment h in region j’s portfolio of investments. If the value of 
the index equals zero, the markets of regions i and j are completely different, and the intensity 
of competition between the two regions would be at a minimum. In other words, the 
relationship between the regions can be regarded as fully complementary. If the value of the 
index equals one, the markets of regions i and j completely overlap, and the intensity of 
competition between the two regions would be at a maximum.  
However, a serious drawback of the relative Manhattan distance is that it does not take 
into account the absolute number of investments, and accordingly, it only reflects the degree 
of competition well when the sizes of the regions are more or less equal (Jenkins, 2008). By 
focusing on portfolio structure instead of the number of investments, the index implies that 
the competitive threat posed by region A to region B is the same as the competitive threat 
posed by region B to region A, which only works when both regions are relatively similar in 
(economic) size. The illogicality of this measurement also becomes clear when, for example, 
region A is London and region B is Malta (see also Jenkins, 2008). From the perspective of a 
region like Malta that is concerned about the competition it faces from a region such as 
London, what is important is the proportion of its investment portfolio for which it has to 
compete with London as a location of residence. In other words, the share of these 
investments in the portfolio of London does not matter as such. As such, territorial 
competition should be based on an absolute advantage principle and not on a comparative 
advantage principle (Camagni, 2002). Accordingly, we use a weighted similarity index (for a 
similar approach, see Thissen et al., 2012) to assess the competitive threat regions pose to one 
another. For any investment type, a region will experience fierce competition from a 
competitor region if (1) the investments constitute an important part of the region’s 
investment portfolio and (2) the level of these investments is at the same level as that of its 
competitor region. Formally, the competitive threat C region j poses to i can be expressed as 
follows: 
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,                      (2) 
 
In which  is the share of market segment h (sector by function by world region) in region 
i’s portfolio of investments,  is the number of investments region i receives in market 
segment h, and  is the number of investments region j receives in market segment h. Like 
the relative Manhattan index, the weighted similarity index ranges from 0 (complementary 
relationship) to 1 (competitive relationship). The proposed index is asymmetric in that the 
territorial competition region A receives from region B does not necessarily have to be the 
same as the territorial competition region B receives from region A.  
However, a weakness of this revealed competition measure is that outcomes are, at least to 
some extent, dependent on the definition of the different market segments (see also Kellmann 
and Schroder, 1983). Here, we have considered a classification that includes neither too many 
nor too few separate segments, while taking into account theoretical considerations of 
plausibility and functionality. Based on our data (described in the next section), the market 
segments are delineated by 9 broad sectors, 7 functions9, and 7 world regions of origin10. The 
result is 441 (9*7*7) potential market segments. In 315 of these 441 potential segments, at 
least 1 investment was made, while in 262 segments more than 1 investment was made  
4. Data 
To analyse the degree of competition between European regions, we make use of the 
Financial Times fDI Markets database, a detailed register of cross-border investments that are 
made worldwide. The greenfield projects that are covered include new investments and 
expansions, but not mergers, acquisitions, or joint ventures. More specifically, we focus on 
investment projects in 264 NUTS-2 regions11 across 29 European countries (EU-25 as well as 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) for the period January 2003 - October 2011. 
These data are recorded on the basis of formal announcements by the media, financial 
information providers, industry organisations, and market and publication companies. All 
                                                 
9 The taxonomy of sectors and functions is based on the classification presented in the work of Van Oort (2004), where the subsectors within 
the broad sectors have related production processes and locational demands. A similar taxonomy was for the different functions (see also 
Castellani and Pieri, 2010). The categorization of countries in five world regions (Western Europe, Rest of Europe, North America, Asia-
Pacific and Rest of the World) is based on the idea that motivations for intra-bloc investments (investments form the EU into the EU) are 
substantially different from inter-bloc investments. Likewise, motivations for MNCs from developing countries to invest in Europe are 
substantially different from those of developing countries.  
10 Latin America, Africa and the Middle East are here included as seperate categories. 
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projects are cross-referenced with multiple sources, and 90% of all investment projects are 
validated with company sources. No official minimum investment size exists, although 
investment projects creating less than 10 full-time jobs or involving a total investment of less 
than $1 million are relatively uncommon. At present, the fDI Markets database is the leading 
source of FDI project data for the large FDI statistics organizations, such as the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) and World Bank. When we compare the distribution of inward investments across the 
NUTS-1 regions in the fDi Markets database with the distribution of inward investments in 
the Ernst & Young’s European Investment Monitor for the period 2003-2008 (Brienen et al., 
2010), we find a correlation of 0.94. Likewise, the distribution of investments across sectors 
and functions in the two datasets is comparable.  
Overall, the database contains 27,550 investments made in Europe by 12,240 MNCs. 
Approximately one third of these investments are made by the top 500 firms. For 26,995 
(98.0%) of these investments, detailed information was available regarding the NUTS-2 
region in which the investment was made. Figures 1-3 show the distribution of these 
investments in Europe across broad sectors, economic functions, and world region of origin 
(see Appendix A). Figure 1 shows that most investments are relatively equally spread across 
sectors. Most investments were made in the ICT and telecommunications sectors (20%) and 
the low-tech manufacturing (16%) sector. However, when we examine the distribution of 
investments across economic functions (i.e., the stage or activity within the value chain of the 
firm) in Figure 2, we see a strong concentration of investments in production plants (32%) 
and sales and marketing offices (27%). Headquarters and R&D units are less targeted 
functions. Most investments (53%) made by MNCs are based in Western Europe (Figure 3).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1-3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1 gives an indication of the spatial distribution of foreign investments in Europe by 
presenting the top 20 regions in Europe in terms of the number of inward investments they 
receive. Most foreign investments are targeted at Greater London (6.7%) and the Ile-de-
France (4.4%, Paris) region. Not surprisingly, this concentration mainly includes investments 
in business services, sales and marketing, and headquarters functions in the ICT and 
telecommunications, financial services, commercial services, and high-tech manufacturing 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 This excludes Andorra (AD00), Faeroe Islands (FO00) Greenland (GL00), Gibraltar (GI00), Guernsey (GG00), Isle of Man (IM00), 
Jersey (JE00) and Monaco (MC00). However, data for these territories is available upon request. 
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sectors. In reality, most European top regions are overspecialised in attracting foreign 
investments in higher value-added sectors and functions.12 Nevertheless, there are also strong 
indications of the existence of complementarities among top European regions. For example, 
Ile-de-France (FR10, Paris) specialises in ICT and commercial services, and Rhône-Alpes 
(FR71, Lyon) specialises in high-tech manufacturing, medium-tech manufacturing, 
processing industries, and transport services. Along these lines, most region pairs are not 
completely competitive or complementary but are somewhere in between these two extremes.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
5. Structure of Territorial Competition 
5.1 Competition across Sectors, Functions and World Region of Origin 
Revealed competition within market segments can be compared by dividing the sum of the 
weighted similarity index across region pairs and relevant market segments by the maximum 
possible overlap for the relevant segments.13 Table 2 shows the revealed competition between 
European regions for different types of investments by sector and function. From this table, it 
is clear that competition over investments in the low value-added sectors and functions is 
higher than across the high value-added sectors and functions. The competition for 
investments in low-tech manufacturing (0.35) and process industries (0.34) is much higher 
than for investments in the services sectors. Likewise, the competition for investments in 
production (0.34) and logistics (0.27) is much higher than for headquarter functions (0.10), 
which is consistent with the expectation that territorial competition is fiercest for those 
investments that do not require highly specific location factors and the observation that 
investments in the lower value-added segments are more equally distributed across European 
regions than investments in the higher value-added segments. Table 2 indicates that a larger 
share of regions receives at least 1 investment in lower value-added segments such as 
production plants, logistics, low-tech manufacturing, and process industries. In addition, 
investments in these lower value-added segments are less concentrated in only a few regions.   
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
12 Most regions with a strong overspecialization in inward foreign investments in lower-value added sectors (e.g., low-tech manufacturing) 
and functions (e.g., production plants) can be found in peripheral Europe.  
13 Typically, this is a situation in which the investments in the relevant segments are perfectly equally distributed across the regions. Hence, 
the maximum possible overlap is computed as the share of investments in the relevant market segments in the investments times the number 
of region pairs. 
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In addition, competition for investments from Western Europe is much fiercer than 
competition for investments from other parts of the world. The latter are concentrated in only 
a few European regions. For example, Greater London receives only 2.9% of all investments 
from Western Europe. At the same time, it receives 12.1% of all investments from North 
America, 9.1% of all investments from the Asia-Pacific region, 8.9% of all investments from 
the rest of Europe, and 11.1% of all investments from the rest of the world. As indicated by 
Rugman and Verbeke (2005), the scope of most MNCs is continental and not global, and 
there are only a few truly global regions in the European urban network that link the other 
European regions to the rest of the world, including Greater London, Ile-de-France, and, to a 
lesser extent, the regions around Dublin (linked to North America); Madrid (linked to North- 
and Latin America); Frankfurt (linked to North America and Asia-Pacific); Munich (linked to 
North-America and Asia-Pacific); Amsterdam (linked to North-America); and Düsseldorf 
(linked to Asia-Pacific).14  
Looking at the top 10 competitive market segments in Table 3, the competition appears to 
be fiercest for West-European and North-American (efficiency-seeking) investments in 
production units in the low- and medium-tech manufacturing industries. The lowest degree of 
competition can be found in the smallest market segments. However, there are also a 
considerable number of large market segments (consisting of more than 100 investments) in 
which the degree of territorial competition is relatively low (that is, an overlap of <0.15). As 
shown in Table 4, this predominantly market- and strategic-asset-seeking investments in 
financial and other commercial services offices. 
 
INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.2 Revealed Competition between Regions 
The relationships between some regions are more competitive than the relationships between 
others. Table 5 shows the most important competitors of the Greater London (UKI) and 
Lower Silesia (PL51) regions as well as the regions to which Greater London and Lower 
Silesia pose a competitive threat. As indicated in Table 1, these regions have distinct 
specialisations in foreign investments. Whereas London ranks first in the number of inward 
investments in business services, financial services, and ICT and software, Lower Silesia 
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ranks first in the number of inward investments in production plants. The relationship 
between Greater London and Lower Silesia is essentially complementary. Both the 
competitive threat that Lower Silesia poses to London (0.06) and the competitive threat that 
Greater London poses to Lower Silesia (0.250) can be considered to be very low. 
From Table 5, it is clear that the main competitor regions of Greater London are not the 
same as the competitor regions of Lower Silesia. Whereas Greater London mainly faces 
competition from Ile-de-France (0.588), Dublin (0.367), and Madrid (0.366), Lower Silesia is 
mainly ‘at war’ with Western Slovakia (0.651), Catalonia (0.641), and Silesia (0.605). A 
similar observation can be made with respect to the regions to which Greater London and 
Lower Silesia pose a threat. Regions that face considerable competition from Greater London 
include both large regions with a similar investment portfolio (e.g., Ile-de-France and 
Communidad de Madrid) and small regions receiving only a small number of specific 
investments (e.g., Drenthe, Cantabria, Koblenz and West-Vlaanderen). Still, the relationships 
between regions are not necessarily competitive but can also be complementary. For example, 
Merseyside (UKD5), Essex (UKH3), Surrey, East and West Sussex (UKJ2), and Devon 
(UKK4) do not face a large competitive threat from London, having less than a one third 
overlap of their investment portfolio with Greater London’s.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.3 The Gravity of Revealed Competition and Complementarities 
Distinctiveness in relation to complementary relationships between European regions can be 
analysed by using a gravity-type regression model.15 Following our theoretical discussion, it 
can be argued that similarity in locational endowments induces competition between regions, 
and dissimilarity in locational endowments generates complementarities between regions in 
attracting foreign investments. To explain the geography of competition and 
complementarities in the European regional network, we include variables that measure the 
absolute value (modulus) of the difference in location characteristics between regions. These 
variables can be linked to the main motivations of MNCs to invest in foreign regions (see 
Section 2.1). More specifically, we take into consideration variables related to the 
attractiveness of locations and that are often used in the analysis of the location choice of 
                                                                                                                                                        
14 On a similar note, most foreign investments originating from Eastern Europe are still targeted at East European countries. For example, 
over 50% of all Latvian foreign investments in European countries are targeted at Estonia and Lithuania. 
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MNCs (see, e.g., Head and Mayer, 2004; Defever, 2005; Basile et al., 2008; 2009; Brienen et 
al., 2010), as they can be linked to the different motivations of firms to invest abroad. 
Our dependent variable is the log of the weighted similarity index for the period 2003-
2010, as presented in equation 2. For natural resource-seeking motives, we include 
employment in mining and quarrying as a share of total employment. For market-seeking 
motives, we include market size, GDP per capita, and accessibility. In line with the market-
seeking hypothesis, larger regions in terms of Gross Value Added tend to be more attractive to 
MNCs because MNCs are thereby able to serve a larger market. GDP per capita measures the 
purchasing power in the region, while accessibility by air and accessibility by road and rail 
are included to capture the quality of the infrastructure, as it can be expected that regions that 
are better accessible will receive more investments. For efficiency-seeking motives, we 
include wage per hour, social charges rate, and corporate taxes as covariates. The social 
charges rate is provided by the Ernst & Young International Human Capital database and is 
calculated as the non-wage labour costs (payroll taxes, social security contributions, 
recruitment costs) as a percentage of the total labour costs (Brienen et al., 2010). The costs of 
capital are captured by the corporate tax rate and are measured as the statutory tax percentage 
rate at and obtained from the Ernst & Young International Tax database (also see Brienen et 
al., 2010). Both the social charges rate and the tax rate are measured at the country level. 
Finally, strategic asset-seeking motives are measured by the R&D expenditures as % of GDP. 
All variables are measured for the year 2007. Finally, we include distance and similar country 
dummies to account for unobserved similarities between countries located in close proximity 
to each other or falling under the same institutional regime.  
Table 6 provides an overview and description of the variables included in the model.  We 
estimate a two-way fixed effects model, including region fixed effects. Such a doubly 
constrained gravity model ensures that the observed degree of competition equates the 
expected degree of competition and yields consistent parameter estimates for the variables of 
interest (Fotheringham and O’Kelly, 1989; Bröcker and Rohweder, 1990). In addition, it 
controls for omitted variable bias and for the fact that the competitive threat that, for example, 
Greater London poses to other regions is generally greater than the competitive threat that 
small regions such as Drenthe, Cantabria, Koblenz and West-Vlaanderen pose to other 
regions. In a cross-sectional setting, a fixed effects specification implies the inclusion of 
region-specific ‘exporter’ (i.e., regions that pose a competitive threat) and ‘importer’ (i.e., 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 For the use of gravity models (spatial interaction models) in economics and geography, see for example Fotheringham and O’ Kelley 
(1989) and Burger et al. (2009) 
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regions that face competition) dummy variables. Sufficient information was available for 245 
of the 264 regions, yielding 57840 (245*244) observations in our regression model.16 The 
VIF statistics indicated no multicollinearity problems.17  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 7 show the results of the estimation of the log-normal model using the White estimator 
to obtain robust standard errors.18 Overall, it can be inferred that, consistent with the theory, 
most variables have the expected sign and are highly significant. Regions that differ in natural 
resource abundance, income levels, wage costs, accessibility, population density, patent 
intensity, and population with a university degree pose a relatively small competitive threat to 
one another. For example, if the difference in wage per hour between two regions doubles, the 
degree of revealed competition between regions drops by 9%, holding everything else 
constant. Likewise, an increase in the difference in the share of the population with a 
university degree by 1 percentage point increases the degree of revealed competition between 
regions by 0.25 percentage points. We find a negative and significant effect of physical 
distance and the country dissimilarity dummy on the degree of revealed competition between 
regions, holding everything else constant (see Model 2).19 Although this can signify that the 
European market is not (yet) an integrated territory, the significance of the distance and 
country dissimilarity variables might also reflect unobserved differences between regions, 
where regions located in the same country and in close proximity to each other share 
locational similarities not accounted for in the model.   
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.4 Competitive vs. Cooperative Regions 
Some regions face a higher threat of competition than others. The average competitive threat 
region i faces from other regions j can be estimated by summing the revealed competition 
coefficient (equation 2) for i over all competitor regions j and dividing this value by the 
number of regions in the sample. Likewise, the competitive threat region j poses to other 
                                                 
16 In particular, information was missing for the EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) and some extra-
territorial regions belonging to Spain and Portugal (Azores, Madeira, Ceuta, Melilla). 
17 VIF statistics are available upon request. 
18 A Poisson regression (available on request) provided similar results. 
19 As there was considerable multicollinearity between the tax rate and country dissimilarity dummy we ran separate regressions.  
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regions i can be estimated by summing the revealed competition coefficient for j over all 
competitor regions i. As the revealed competition measure is asymmetric, the average 
competitive threat a region poses does not have to be the same as the average competitive 
threat a region faces. 
Table 8 provides an indication of which regions pose the largest (smallest) threat to all 
other regions and which regions face the largest (smallest) competition from all other regions. 
From the table, it can be observed that Greater London, Paris and Dublin, which are 
sufficiently large and distinctive, face the smallest average competitive threat from all other 
regions. In contrast, less populous, peripheral regions such as regions in Central and North 
Greece and the Greek isles appear to encounter greater difficulties because they face a 
relatively large competitive threat from other regions. At the same time, most of these regions 
do not pose a large threat to other regions (correlation = -0.50). The regions that pose the 
largest competitive threat to other regions include some usual suspects (Communidad de 
Madrid, Lombardia, and Oberbayern) as well as some less obvious candidates (Eastern 
Scotland, South Western Scotland, Rhône-Alpes, and Andalucía). The latter group mainly 
consists of large regions receiving numerous foreign investments in medium to highly 
competitive market segments, including the high-tech manufacturing and processing 
industries. A better understanding of the competitive threat a region poses or faces can be 
obtained by means of a linear regression analysis on the average competitive threat using the 
location factors introduced in the previous subsection (3) as explanatory variables.  
 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
We use the logarithm of the competitive threat a region poses or faces as dependent variables. 
Table 9 shows the results of the estimation of the log-normal model. The regression results 
show that those regions that stand out in terms of a large market size, good accessibility by 
air, a skilled labour force, low taxes, and low wages pose the largest competitive threat to 
other European regions (Model 3).20 None of the European regions possesses all these 
qualities, but it at least provides an explanation for the competitive threat that the above-
mentioned second-order West European regions (Eastern Scotland, Southwestern Scotland, 
Rhône-Alpes, and Andalucía) pose to other regions. Accessibility by road, population density 
and rail and natural resource abundance play a less important role. There is a positive effect of 
                                                 
20 In these regressions, GDP per capita had to be omitted due to a high degree of collinearity with the wage variable. 
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R&D expenditures on the amount of competition a region poses to other regions, but there is 
much uncertainty about the true value of this parameter. Examining the competitive threat that 
regions face (Model 4), it is shown that large and densely populated regions face a relatively 
smaller competitive threat. In addition, skilled labour force and low tax rate reduce the 
average competitive threat a region faces from all regions. A similar picture is obtained when 
conducting a regression analysis on the degree to which a region poses a threat to other 
regions relative to the degree to which a region faces a competitive threat from other regions 
(Model 5). These results convincingly show that there are indeed two ways to outcompete 
other regions in attracting investments: having capacity-building policies that stimulate the 
knowledge base of the regions and incentive-based policies that reduce the cost of capital and 
labour. Accordingly, cities and regions can focus on capacity-building policies that are 
associated with promoting productivity and economic growth more broadly, and hence 
increase the attractiveness of the location, or policies such as subsidies and tax breaks that 
specifically target MNCs (see also Globerman and Chen, 2010). 
 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
6. Conclusions and Discussion 
This paper introduces an indicator to measure the intensity of competition between pairs of 
regions, which can be considered the most fine-grained level at which competition can be 
measured. Regions are considered to be in competition when they have overlapping 
investment portfolios in terms of (1) sectors in which it is invested, (2) functions in which it is 
invested, and (3) geographical origin of the investment. Using the revealed competition 
measure as a building block, it is possible to identify competitive market segments, derive the 
competitive threat a region faces from other regions, the competitive threat regions pose to 
other regions, and the most important market segments in which regions compete.  
In this paper, we applied the revealed competition measure to territorial competition for 
foreign investments in Europe using data on greenfield investments. In light of European 
integration and globalisation, it is often argued that territorial competition will increase as the 
free movement of capital, goods and workers and the removal of economic, social and 
cultural barriers have made national boundaries disappear. Accordingly, MNCs often perceive 
European regions with similar characteristics situated in different countries as closer 
substitutes than dissimilar regions in the same country. This perception is, at least partly, 
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reflected in our empirical assessment, which shows that European regions with similar 
locational endowments pose a fiercer competitive threat to one another than regions with 
different locational endowments. However, some regions are more competitive than others in 
that they pose a relatively higher competitive threat to other regions and at the same time face 
a relatively limited competitive threat from other regions. Typically, these are large, 
accessible regions with a skilled labour force and/or low costs of capital and labour. Regional 
giants such as Greater London and Ile-de-France battle against each other, but they face a low 
competitive threat from other regions in that they are simultaneously large and sufficiently 
distinctive. These regions specialise in attracting high value-added investments in financial 
and business services. Perhaps paradoxically, territorial and regional competition for 
investments appears fiercest for those foreign investments that have the lowest value added 
(i.e., efficiency-seeking investments in production plants in low- and medium-tech 
manufacturing) and that no region really prefers. However, when the location requirements 
for investments are minimal, the number of regions that are included in the consideration set 
of a MNC is relatively large.  As a MNC can choose from a wide range of locations, it can 
play governments against each other by asking for tax cuts or subsidies. Hence, a high degree 
of competition in this market as reflected by the revealed competition measure would also 
make sense from a substantive point of view.  
There are, however, some limitations with regard to the measurement of the revealed 
competition indicator, which require further investigation. Most importantly, results can be 
dependent on the size and relative size of the pairs of regions confronted. A large region 
experiences less threat from a small region than vice versa. This is acceptable in economic 
terms as long as regions are similarly defined. However, NUTS-2 regions in Belgium, 
Germany, and the Netherlands are more similar to NUTS-3 regions in France, Italy and 
Poland than to their respective NUTS-2 regions. A solution here could be to follow the OECD 
mixed NUTS 1-2 (TL1) or NUTS 2-3 (TL2) delimitations. At any case, future research should 
address the sensitivity of results to this Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (Openshaw and 
Taylor, 1979). A similar case can be made with regard to the definition of the different 
segments.  
Finally, we focused on the number of investments and did not take in the size of the 
investments in terms of the amount of capital that is invested or the number of jobs that are 
created due to data availability. To the casual observer, the most intense competition between 
European regions in recent decades was in the 1990s when a series of very large investment 
projects in manufacturing was being offered up as Japanese, Korean, and German companies 
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internationalised (Phelps et al., 1998; Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones, 2001). On the one hand, our 
research also indicates that competition is fiercest for these large numbers of jobs in 
production plants since investments in these segments (low-tech manufacturing, process 
industries, and production plants) are relatively footloose in that they do not have very 
specific location requirements. On the other hand, it can be argued that the intensity of 
competition for the investment projects also varies according to the size of investment and 
this deserves attention in future research. 
The revealed competition measure presented in this paper is not meant to replace other 
accounts of territorial competitiveness and territorial competition but rather should be 
perceived as complementary. First, the rankings of cities and regions may still be useful as 
indicators of territorial competitiveness, but it is important to recognise that not all relations 
between territories are of a competitive nature, and therefore, not all cities and regions should 
be compared by putting them on the same ranking list. Second, having identified the most 
important competitor region and its competitive advantage in attracting foreign investments, it 
becomes easier for regional planners and marketers to recognise the aspects of competitive 
advantage that should be addressed to increase the likelihood of attracting foreign 
investments, which facilitates more goal-directed and effective strategic planning and policy 
making with regards to territorial competitiveness. In this respect, regional authorities also 
increasingly recognise that foreign investments are not, by definition, a catalyst for economic 
growth and that it is best to attract investments that complement the economic structure of the 
region to promote sustainable development. It is not easier to attract such investments, but the 
probability that an MNC will become embedded in the regional economy (e.g., local labour 
markets, input-output structures) and not relocate will also be increased. 
In addition to indicating the intensity of territorial competition, future research can utilise 
the revealed competition measure by linking territorial competition to territorial performance. 
Other aspects of in inter-regional competition based on trade (see Thissen et al., 2012) should 
also be investigated. Accordingly, the focus shifts from territorial competition as a dependent 
variable (“causes of urban competition”) to territorial competition as an independent variable 
(“consequences of urban competition”). Naturally, new questions arise. How does territorial 
competition affect territorial performance? Are cities and regions that face less competitive 
threat from other regions more likely to grow and strengthen their position within the urban 
system? Is it is through increasing competition over time and space that places can become 
specialized in particular activities, whereupon they are regarded as complementary and 
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therefore seeming to act in a cooperative manner? Similarly, a research program in which 
interactions between the local and the global take centre stage unfolds. 
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Appendix A: Taxonomy of Investments by Sector and Function 
 
Category Sectors 
Processing Industries and Natural Resource 
Extraction 
Alternative/Renewable Energy 
Chemicals 
Coal, Oil & Natural Gas 
Minerals 
Low-Tech Manufacturing Beverages 
Ceramics & Glass 
Consumer Products 
Food & Tobacco 
Metals 
Paper, Printing & Packaging 
Plastics 
Rubber 
Textiles 
Wood Products 
Medium-Tech Manufacturing Automotive Components 
Automotive OEM 
Building & Construction Materials 
Engines & Turbines 
Industrial Machinery 
Non-Automotive Transport OEM 
High-Tech Manufacturing Aerospace 
Biotechnology 
Business Machines & Equipment 
Consumer Electronics 
Electronics Components 
Medical Devices 
Pharmaceuticals 
Semiconductors 
Transport Services Transportation 
Warehousing & Storage 
Software and Information and Communication 
Technologies 
Communications 
Software & IT Services 
Space & Defense 
Financial Services Financial Services 
Commercial Services Business Services 
Real Estate 
Consumer Services Healthcare 
Hotels  & Tourism 
Leisure & Entertainment 
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Category Functions 
Headquarters Headquarters 
Business Services Business Services 
Research and Development Design, Development, and Testing 
Research and Development 
Sales and Marketing Retail 
Sales, Marketing, and Support 
Production Electricity 
Extraction 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Recycling 
Support and Servicing Customer Contact Centres 
Education and Training 
ICT and Internet Infrastructure 
Maintenance 
Shared Service Centres 
Technical Support Centres 
Logistics Logistics 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Inward Investments across Sectors 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Inward Investments across Functions 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Inward Investments across World Regions 
 
Note: rest of the world includes Africa, Middle East, an Latin America 
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Table 1: Investment Portfolios of the Top 20 NUTS-2 Regions 
Rank Region Name (Main City) Number of 
Investments 
(% of total) 
Sector Specialization(s) (LQ>1.2) Function Specialization(s) 
(LQ>1.2) 
1 UKI Greater London  1814 (6.7%) Financial Services, ICT, Commercial 
Services, Consumer Services 
Business Services, Sales and 
Marketing, Headquarters 
2 FR10 Ile-de-France (Paris) 1176 (4.4%) ICT, Commercial Services Sales and Marketing, Business 
Services 
3 IE02 Southern and Eastern 
Ireland (Dublin) 
781 (2.9%)  Financial Services, ICT, High-tech 
Manufacturing, Consumer Services 
Headquarters, R&D, Support 
and Servicing, Business 
Services 
4 ES30 Communidad de 
Madrid 
613 (2.3%)   
5 ES51 Cataluña (Barcelona) 563 (2.2%) Low-tech Manufacturing, Transport R&D, Headquarters, Logistics 
6 DEA1 Düsseldorf 526 (2.1%) Low-tech Manufacturing, Commercial 
services 
Headquarters, Sales and 
Marketing, Business Services 
7 HU10 Közép-Magyar. 
(Budapest) 
545 (2.0%) Consumer Services, Commercial 
Services 
Support and Servicing, R&D 
8 PL12 Mazovia (Warsaw) 536 (2.0%) Commercial Services, Transport, 
Financial Services 
- 
9 DE21 Oberbayern (Munich) 497 (1.6%) ICT, High-tech Manufacturing, 
Commercial Services 
Sales and Marketing, Business 
Services, R&D 
10 DE71 Darmstadt (Frankfurt) 427 (1.4%) Financial Services, ICT, Commercial 
Services 
Business Services, Sales and 
Marketing, Support and 
Servicing 
11 ITC4 Lombardia (Milan) 407 (1.5%) Financial Services, High-tech 
Manufacturing, ICT 
Sales and Marketing, Business 
Services 
12 NL32 Noord-Holland 
(Amsterdam) 
382 (1.4%) ICT, Financial Services, Commercial 
Services 
Headquarters, Support and 
Servicing, Business Services 
13 FR71 Rhône-Alpes (Lyon) 372 (1.4%) High-tech Manufacturing, Medium-Tech 
Manufacturing, Process Industries, 
Transport 
Sales and Marketing, 
Headquarters 
14 CZ01 Praha (Praha) 349 (1.3%) Consumer Services, Commercial 
Services, Financial Services, Transport 
Business Services, R&D, Sales 
and Marketing 
15 DK01 Hovedstaden 
(Copenhagen) 
347 (1.3%) ICT, Commercial Services, High-tech 
Manufacturing 
Headquarters, Business 
Services, Sales and Marketing, 
R&D 
16 SE11 Stockholm  318 (1.2%) Financial Services, ICT, Commercial 
Services 
Business Services, Sales and 
Marketing 
      
17 UKJ1 East Anglia 
(Cambridge) 
303 (1.1%) ICT, High-tech Manufacturing Headquarters, Sales and 
Marketing, R&D, Support and 
Servicing,  
18 AT13 Wien  299 (1.1%) Consumer Services, Financial Services, 
Commercial Services 
Business Services, 
Headquarters, Sales and 
Marketing 
19 PL51 Lower Silesia 
(Wroclaw) 
292 (1.1%) Medium-tech Manufacturing, High-tech 
Manufacturing, Low-tech 
Manufacturing 
Production plants 
20 BE10 Brussels  281 (1.0%) Commercial Services, ICT Business Services, 
Headquarters,  Sales and 
Marketing 
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Table 2: Revealed Competition across Sector, Function, and World Region of Origin 
Sector Overlap Share of regions that 
receive at least one 
investment 
Share of inward 
investments of top 10 
regions 
Low-tech Manufacturing 0.355 0.932 0.184 
Process Industries 0.343 0.883 0.194 
Transport Services 0.293 0.826 0.233 
Medium-tech Manufacturing 0.266 0.902 0.205 
High-tech Manufacturing 0.241 0.890 0.256 
Software and ICT 0.208 0.845 0.448 
Commercial Services 0.206 0.837 0.401 
Consumer Services 0.201 0.652 0.344 
Financial Services 0.190 0.667 0.456 
Function Overlap Share of regions that 
receive at least one 
investment 
Share of inward 
investments of top 10 
regions 
Production Plants 0.351 0.977 0.172 
Logistics 0.274 0.867 0.212 
Sales and Marketing 0.216 0.883 0.393 
Business Services 0.203 0.818 0.423 
R&D 0.171 0.761 0.290 
Support and Servicing 0.171 0.777 0.312 
Headquarters 0.108 0.595 0.444 
World Region of Origin Overlap Share of regions that 
receive at least one 
investment 
Share of inward 
investments of top 10 
regions 
Western Europe 0.332 0.992 0.237 
North America 0.225 0.936 0.367 
Asia-Pacific 0.170 0.837 0.332 
Rest of Europe 0.082 0.564 0.367 
Latin America 0.031 0.258 0.532 
Africa 0.020 0.231 0.448 
 
Note: Classifications sorted on overlap 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Table 3: Most Competitive Market Segments in European Market for Investments 
 
Rank 
Number of 
Investments Overlap Sector Function 
World Region of 
Origin 
1 921 0.454 Processing Industries Production Western Europe 
     
     2 1707 0.437 Low-tech Manufacturing Production Western Europe 
     
     3 766 0.406 Transport Services Logistics Western Europe 
     
     4 486 0.397 Low-tech Manufacturing Production North America 
     
     5 573 0.354 High-tech Manufacturing Production Western Europe 
     
     6 1206 0.346 Medium-tech Manufacturing Production Western Europe 
 
7 316 0.338 Low-tech Manufacturing Logistics Western Europe 
 
8 1181 0.300 Software and ICT Sales and Marketing Western Europe 
 
9 407 0.296 Consumer Services Productiona Western Europe 
 
10 1042 0.296 Financial Services Business Services Western Europe 
 
a This mainly include the construction of hotels and entertainment facilities 
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Table 4: Least Competitive Large Market Segments in European Market for 
Investments 
Number of 
Investments Overlap Sector Function World Region of Origin 
341 0.079 Financial Services Business Services Asia-Pacific 
100 0.098 Consumer Services Productiona Middle East 
159 0.100 Financial Services Business Services Rest of Europe 
355 0.114 Software and ICT Headquarters North America 
106 0.119 Software and ICT Business Services North America 
118 0.132 Financial Services Business Services North America 
421 0.135 Financial Services Sales and Marketing North America 
188 0.136 Financial Services Sales and Marketing Western Europe 
150 0.137 Low-tech Manufacturing Sales and Marketing Asia-Pacific 
134 0.142 Consumer Services Sales and Marketing Western Europe 
 
a This mainly include the construction of hotels and entertainment facilities 
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Table 5: Main Competitive Relationships of Greater London and Lower Silesia 
Competitive threat posed on Greater London: Competitive threat posed on Lower Silesia: 
Code Region name Main city Overlap Code Region name Main city Overlap 
FR10 Ile-de-France Paris 0.588 SK02 Západné Slovensko Nitra 0.651 
IE02 Southern and Eastern Ireland Dublin 0.367 ES51 Cataluña Barcelona 0.641 
ES30 Communidad de Madrid Madrid 0.366 PL22 Silesia (Slaskie) Katowice 0.605 
DE21 Oberbayern Munich 0.345 HU21 Közép-Dunántúl Székesfehérvár 0.584 
DE71 Darmstadt Frankfurt 0.299 HU10 Közép-Magyarország Budapest 0.577 
NL32 Noord-Holland Amsterdam 0.289 PL12 Mazowiecki Warsaw 0.556 
ITC4 Lombardia Milan 0.279 HU22 Nyugat-Dunántúl Gyor 0.546 
PL12 Mazowiecki Warsaw 0.258 FR71 Rhône-Alpes Lyon 0.535 
DEA1 Düsseldorf Düsseldorf 0.252 EE00 Estonia Tallinn 0.515 
DK01 Hovedstaden Copenhagen 0.258 PL41 Wielkopolskie Poznan 0.493 
Greater London posing competitive threat to: Lower Silesia posing competitive threat to: 
Code Region name Main city Overlap Code Region name Main city Overlap 
FR10 Ile-de-France Paris 0.687 SK02 Západné Slovensko Nitra 0.812 
NL13 Drenthe Assen 0.679 PL22 Silesia (Slaskie) Katowice 0.688 
ES13 Cantabria Santander 0.608 HU21 Közép-Dunántúl Székesfehérvár 0.687 
DEB1 Koblenz Koblenz 0.580 HU22 Nyugat-Dunántúl Gyor 0.674 
BE25 West-Vlaanderen Brugge 0.575 FI1A Pohjois-Suomi Oulu 0.610 
ES30 Communidad de Madrid Madrid 0.573 PL11 Lódzkie Lódz 0.593 
NL34 Zeeland Middelburg 0.569 CZ04 Severozápad Ústí nad Labem 0.592 
PL33 Swietokrzyskie Kielce 0.566 FR41 Lorraine Metz 0.592 
PL52 Opolskie Opole 0.558 ITC3 Liguria Genoa 0.589 
AT34 Vorarlberg Bregenz 0.548 HU32 Észak-Alföld Debrecen 0.583 
 
For representation, only regions with more than 10 inward investments are presented in this table. 
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Table 6: Variables Included in the Regression Models 
Variable Description Source 
Natural resource intensity difference Absolute difference of share of employment in mining and energy of region i and j CE 
Market size difference Absolute difference of log of value added of regions i and j CE 
GDP per capita difference Absolute difference of log of (regional GDP/population) of regions i and j CE 
Accessibility by air difference Absolute difference of log of accessibility by air index of regions i and j ESPON 
Accessibility by road and rail difference Absolute difference of log of accessibility by rail and road index of regions i and j ESPON 
Wage per hour difference Absolute difference of log of (wages/total hours worked) of regions i and j CE 
Population density difference Absolute difference of log of (regional population / total area in km2) of regions i and j CE 
R&D intensity rate difference Absolute difference of R&D expenditures as % of GDP of regions i and j Eurostat 
University degree rate difference Absolute difference share of population (>15) with university degree rate (ISCED 5-6) of regions i and j  Eurostat 
Social charges rate difference Absolute difference of social charges rate of region i and j (measured at country level) EY HC 
Corporate tax rate difference Absolute difference of statutory corporate tax rate of regions i and j (measured at country level) EY Tax 
Physical distance Log of the geodesic distance between region i and j - 
Country dissimilarity Takes value 1 when located in a different country - 
CE = Cambridge Econometrics, EY HC = Ernst & Young Human Capital database, EY Tax = Ernst & Young International Tax database 
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Table 7: OLS on Revealed Competition between Regions 
 Model 1 
Ln(Cji) 
Model 2 
Ln(Cji) 
Regional level   
Market size difference -0.00 (.007) -0.00 (.007) 
GDP per capita difference -0.08 (.018)** -0.08 (.018)** 
Accessibility by air difference -0.26 (.020)** -0.26 (.020)** 
Accessibility by rail and road difference -0.05 (.007)** -0.05 (.007)** 
Population density difference -0.03 (.005)** -0.03 (.005)** 
Wage per hour difference -0.09 (.021)** -0.09 (.021)** 
R&D Expenditures difference -0.42 (.385) -0.38 (.386) 
University degree rate difference -0.25 (.052)** -0.24 (.053)** 
Natural resource intensity difference  0.60 (.710)  0.58 (.701) 
Physical distance -0.07 (.007)** -0.05 (.007)** 
   
Country level   
Social charges rate difference   0.00 (.086)  
Corporate tax rate difference  -0.05 (.077)  
Situated in different country  -0.07 (.013)** 
   
Observations 59780 59780 
‘Importer’ fixed effects YES YES 
‘Exporter’ fixed effects YES YES 
R-squared 0.67 0.67 
Root MSE 0.72 0.72 
**p<0.01, *p<0.05, robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 8: Regions facing largest (smallest) competitive threat from other regions and regions posing the largest competitive threat to other regions 
Facing smallest competitive threat from other regions Posing largest competitive threat to other regions 
Code Region name Main city Average Overlap Code Region name Main city Average Overlap 
UKI1 Greater London London 0.050 ITC4 Lombardia Milan 0.384 
FR10 Ile-de-France Paris 0.081 DEA2 Köln Köln 0.379 
IE02 Southern and Eastern Ireland Dublin 0.109 UKM3 South Western Scotland Glasgow 0.371 
DEA1 Düsseldorf Düsseldorf 0.133 DE71 Darmstadt Frankfurt 0.365 
DE21 Oberbayern Munich 0.134 CZ01 Praha Prague 0.355 
NL32 Noord-Holland Amsterdam 0.138 ES61 Andalucia Sevilla 0.353 
DE71 Darmstadt Frankfurt 0.140 FR71 Rhône-Alpes Lyon 0.352 
ES30 Communidad de Madrid Madrid 0.142 UKM2 Eastern Scotland Edinburgh 0.349 
UKJ1 Berkshire, Bucks, and Oxfordshire  Oxford 0.145 DE21 Oberbayern Munich 0.345 
ES51 Cataluña Barcelona 0.148 ES30 Communidad de Madrid Madrid 0.343 
Facing largest competitive threat from other regions  Posing smallest competitive threat to other regions 
Code Region name Main city Average Overlap Code Region name Main city Average Overlap 
GR41 Voreio Aigaio Mytilene 0.519 GR13 Dytiki Makedonia Kozani 0.005 
DEB2 Trier Trier 0.477 NO06 Trøndelag Trondheim 0.009 
PT20 Azores Ponta Delgada 0.470 GR11 Anatoliki Makedonia Komotini 0.009 
ITE2 Umbria Perugia 0.450 FR83 Corse Ajaccio 0.020 
NL34 Zeeland Middelburg 0.425 GR21 Ipeiros Ioannina 0.024 
GR24 Sterea Ellada Lamia 0.419 GR25 Peloponnese Tripoli 0.026 
GR42 Notio Aigaio Ermoupoli 0.418 ITE3 Marche Ancona 0.029 
ES43 Extremadura Mérida 0.417 ITF2 Sardegna Cagliari 0.029 
PL34 Podlaskie Bialystok 0.416 NL12 Friesland Leeuwarden 0.030 
AT34 Vorarlberg Bregrenz 0.411 ITD2 Trentino-Alto Adige Trento 0.032 
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Table 9: OLS on Competitive Threat Posed and Faced by Regions  
 Model 3 
Ln(Threat Posed) 
Model 4 
Ln (Threat Faced) 
Model 5 
Ln(Posed/Faced) 
Regional level    
Ln Market size    0.45 (.048)** -0.13 (.022)**   0.58 (.046)** 
Ln Accessibility by air   0.60 (.183)** -0.09 (.083)   0.73 (.140)** 
Ln Accessibility by road and rail   0.08 (.049)   0.01 (.016)   0.07 (.050) 
Ln Population density   -0.08 (.048) -0.08 (.022)**  -0.01 (.043) 
Ln Wage per hour   -0.60 (.088)**   0.06 (.047)  -0.66 (.080)** 
R&D expenditures (% GDP)    4.05 (2.42)   0.34 (1.18)   3.71 (2.32) 
University degree rate    1.71 (.294)** -0.99 (.219)**   2.70 (.410)** 
Natural resource intensity   -2.91 (6.81) -5.34 (3.36)   2.43 (4.50) 
    
Country level    
Social charges rate   1.00 (.798)  -0.28 (.290)  1.28 (.850) 
Corporate tax rate  -2.84 (.691)**   1.47 (.303)** -4.28 (.807)** 
    
Observations 245 245 245 
R-squared 0.55 0.50 0.73 
Root MSE 0.45 0.22 0.42 
**p<0.01, *p<0.05, robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
